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How is your proposal WTO-compliant? This is a ques-tion that farm groups must
be prepared to answer when they
travel to Washington looking for
increased subsidies. That an inter-
national trade agreement should
be playing such a prominent role
in shaping U.S. farm programs may
be surprising. But this prominence
is likely to continue as long as the
United States remains committed
to expanding world trade through
negotiated agreements.
Many people both inside and
outside of agriculture do not real-
ize that the United States put strict
limits on its ability to subsidize U.S.
farmers. It did this to win agree-
ment from other countries to limit
their own subsidies. Because we
are a net exporter of agricultural
products, U.S. producers should
expect to see a gain from such
trade-expanding agreements. But
the downside of the agreement—at
least from the point of view of U.S.
producers—is that Congress no
longer has complete freedom in its
design of farm programs.
WHAT IS THE WTO?
The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is the successor organiza-
tion to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its mis-
sion is to provide a mechanism to
resolve trade disputes between
countries and to expand interna-
tional trade by lowering existing bar-
riers and preventing new ones. The
WTO is an institution with staff mem-
bers, but WTO is also used as short-
hand to refer to sector-level trade
agreements that exist within the
WTO. Agriculture has such an agree-
ment. It is called the URAA (Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture).
In the URAA, domestic subsidy
programs are classified according
to their impact on trade flows. The
classifications are often described
in terms of colored boxes:  “green”
for those programs that have mini-
mal impacts on trade, “amber” for
programs that have important im-
pacts, and “blue” for programs that
are explicitly allowed in the agree-
ment. The URAA places no limits on
green and blue box programs. Ex-
penditures under amber box pro-
grams are limited. The analogy of a
traffic stoplight adequately de-
scribes what can be done to sup-
port domestic producers under the
WTO. Countries can continue
(“Go”) all green and blue box pro-
grams at any level of funding. Coun-
tries may continue to use amber
box policies as long as the expendi-
tures on them do not exceed set lev-
els (“Proceed with caution”).
Outlawed policies are placed in a
“red” box (“Stop”).
Detailed rules determine the
classification of domestic subsidy
programs. Blue box policies are pro-
duction-limiting policies that base
payments on fixed yields and acre-
age. Payments must be limited to 85
percent of the base level of produc-
tion. The old U.S. target-price-defi-
ciency payment program that
existed before 1996 was a blue box
program. Green box policies are
those that have minimal trade im-
pacts. Payments from green box
policies cannot be linked to current
production and/or prices.
Limits on amber box expendi-
tures are based on a country’s level
of support over a base period. The
countries that signed the URAA
agreed to limit amber box spending
to a level at or below their level of
support during the base period. De-
veloped countries (for example,
the United States, Canada, and Aus-
tralia) and confederations (the Eu-
ropean Union) agreed to 20
percent reductions in their amber
box limits by 1999. Within the am-
ber box, programs can be ex-
empted from the limits if their
payment amounts are considered
too small to count. These exemp-
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tions are referred to as de minimis
exemptions.
For developed countries, a 5
percent de minimis rule is used.
For crop- or product-specific sup-
port, a policy can be declared de
minimis if the expenditures under
the policy are less than 5 percent
of the value of production for the
commodity. For non-crop- or non-
product-specific support, all such
policies can be declared de mini-
mis if total expenditures under all
of the policies are less than 5 per-
cent of the total value of agricul-
tural production in the country.
WHAT BOX FOR CURRENT
U.S. PROGRAMS?
Farm groups want their policy pro-
posals to be classified as green box,
because that would mean that Con-
gress would have complete freedom
to fund the program at any desired
level. However, few programs can be
classified as green box. To see why,
we can examine the classification of
U.S. farm programs for the 1995-
1997 marketing years, the only years
that the United States has submitted
reports to the WTO.
PFC Payments
The Production Flexibility Contract
(PFC) payments, which are one cor-
nerstone of the 1995 FAIR (Federal
Agriculture Improvement and
Reform) Act, fall in the green box.
PFC eligibility requirements and the
amount of payments are based on
historical production patterns over
a fixed base period. Current produc-
tion decisions (even the decision
not to produce at all) do not affect
the size of the payment. Given that
there is no link between current pro-
duction and PFC payments, these
payments should have no effect on
future production and therefore are
not trade distorting.
Price Supports and Marketing Loans
Price support and marketing loan
programs fall in the amber box be-
cause payments depend directly on
current production and prices.
Given this link, the programs influ-
ence future production decisions
and have trade-distorting effects.
For example, current loan rates
have fueled expansion of soybean
acreage relative to corn and wheat
acreage. The larger supply has
decreased world soybean prices,
expanded U.S. exports, and reduced
other countries’ soy exports.
Clearly this direct effect on trade
flows means that LDP payments fall
in the amber box.
Crop Insurance Payments
The other major U.S. program
currently available is the crop
insurance program. Government-
provided insurance or safety net
programs are green box if
1. they insure income only from
agricultural sources;
2. they insure losses only in excess
of 30 percent of average gross
income (or an equivalent
amount of net income) where
average income is determined
by past income levels; and
3. indemnity payments combined
with payments from a natural
disaster relief program do not
exceed 100 percent of the
producer’s total loss.
 Net crop insurance payments
(indemnities less the producer pre-
mium) clearly fall in the amber box
because coverage above 70 percent
is allowed and indemnities are not
based on average past income levels.
Emergency Assistance
Over the last three years, the federal
government has substantially in-
creased agricultural subsidies with
annual emergency assistance pack-
ages. These packages included market
loss assistance (MLA) and crop loss
assistance payments for several com-
modities. The crop loss assistance
payments were constructed to be ex-
empt from WTO limits. However, there
is some question as to whether the
MLA payments are amber or green
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box. Clearly, Congress made the pay-
ments in response to low market
prices. This suggests that they are am-
ber box. But the payments are based
on the PFC formulas that are green
box, which suggests that they should
be classified the same way. After all,
there is no formula linking the pay-
ments to current market prices. Any
link to current prices is derived from
interpreting the intent of Congress.
There is also some question
about whether the payments are
crop-specific or non-product-
specific. The structure of the pay-
ments is non-product-specific
because current production has
no impact on the payments. But the
payment rates are crop-specific.
How the MLA payments are classi-
fied makes a big difference because
their classification determines
whether or not the United States
exceeded its amber box limits.
HAS THE U.S. MET ITS WTO
COMMITMENTS?
Figure 1 shows that whether the
U.S. has met its WTO commitments
depends on whether the MLA pay-
ments are classified as amber or
green box and whether they are
classified as crop-specific or non-
crop-specific payments. The blue
line in Figure 1 shows the WTO am-
ber box limits for the United States.
The white line shows actual (for
1996 and 1997) or projected (after
1997) amber box payments if the
MLA payments are classified either
as green box or as non-crop-specific
payments. The two classifications
give the same result because as
non-crop-specific payments, the
MLA payments can be character-
ized as de minimis, and do not
count toward amber box limits.
They would be classified as de mini-
mis because they do not exceed 5
percent of the value of total agricul-
tural production.
However, as shown by the black
line in Figure 1, if the MLA payments
are classified as amber box and
crop-specific payments, then the
United States has exceeded its am-
ber box commitments. The differ-
ence arises because the payments
for each crop would be compared to
the value of each crop to determine
if they could be classified as de mini-
mis under the 5 percent rule. Our
calculations indicate that they ex-
ceed the 5 percent rule, so they
would count toward the amber box
limits. As shown, this interpretation
leads to higher amber box pay-
ments, adding enough to push the
United States past its limits in both
1999 and 2000.
WHAT BOX FOR PROPOSED
PROGRAMS?
As Congress attempts to design a
new farm bill, judgments will have to
be made regarding how new or ad-
justed policy complies with the am-
ber box commitments shown in
Figure 1. Policies that increase or re-
balance the marketing loan rates
change programs that are already
marked as product-specific amber
box spending programs. Given most
price projections for 2001 and 2002,
such changes would likely lead to
higher amber box payments and
push the United States even closer to
its limit. The often-proposed flexible
fallow program would also be consid-
ered product-specific amber box
spending, even though it has produc-
tion-limiting features (like blue box
programs), because the payments
are triggered by current prices.
The Supplemental Income Pay-
ments (SIP) proposal is a product-spe-
cific amber box program because
payments are triggered by shortfalls
in current crop-specific prices or pro-
duction. The Commission on 21st
Century Production Agriculture’s
countercyclical proposal is non-
product-specific as it looks at income
across eight crops. But our interpreta-
tion of the URAA indicates that it also
would be considered amber box be-
cause current prices and production
from the eight crops are used to deter-
mine the overall amount of payments.
New policies that include environ-
mental payments could also fall into
the amber box if the payment exceeds
the additional cost or loss of income
that producers face in implementing
the requirements of the program.
Most current farm bill proposals
keep the existing programs in place.
This implies that any additional ex-
FIGURE 1. Amber box commitments and spending levels under
alternative classification of market loss assistance payments
Continued on page 7
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As planting time approaches here in Iowa, the cropmarkets are reacting to the prospective plantings fig- ures released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
National Agricultural Statistics Service at the end of March.
For the first time since 1983, intended soybean acreage na-
tionwide is equal to intended corn acreage. Both crops are
being estimated at 76.7 million acres for the 2001 growing
season. This represents a drop of 4 percent from last year for
corn and a rise of 3 percent from last year for soybeans. All
regions of the country, except the Northeast, report reduced
corn planting intentions. Reasons given include high fertilizer
and input costs, low corn prices, wet weather along the Gulf
Coast, and lower water reserves in the Southeast. Most of the
acres shifted out of corn are intended for soybeans. In over
two-thirds of the soybean-producing states, intended soybean
acreage is higher than last year. In Iowa, intended corn acre-
age for 2001 is 11.9 million acres, down 400,000 acres from
2000 levels. Intended soybean acreage is 11 million acres, up
300,000 acres from 2000.
On the day of the Prospective Plantings report release, the
markets initially reacted with higher corn and lower soybean
prices. However, by the end of the day, both corn and soybean
futures contracts had set new contract lows. The higher soy-
bean planting intentions, combined with news of testing for
foot-and-mouth (FMD) disease in North Carolina, had taken
their toll on prices. At the time of this writing, however, the
markets had recouped some of these price declines. The FMD
tests in North Carolina came back negative, and weekly
export inspections were solid.
The report also indicates that producers will continue to
plant biotechnology varieties of both corn and soybeans,
even after the StarLink confusion. Nationwide, one-quarter of
the corn crop in 2000 consisted of biotechnology varieties: 18
percent was Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) insect- resistant corn,
6 percent was herbicide-resistant corn, and 1 percent was a
stacked gene variety having both insect and herbicide resis-
tance. Statewide, 30 percent of the 2000 Iowa corn crop was
genetically modified: 23 percent was Bt corn, while 5 percent
was herbicide resistant and 2 percent was a stacked gene
corn variety. The 2001 intentions survey shows nationwide
that corn producers intend to cut back slightly on Bt corn, but
they intend to increase the percentage of their acres planted
to herbicide-resistant varieties. According to the report, 24
percent of the intended crop will be genetically modified. This
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2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
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Iowa Cash Receipts  Jan. – Dec.
2000 1999 1998
                     (Million Dollars)
Crops 4,979 5,004 6,300
Livestock 5,912 4,712 4,753
Total 10,892 9,716 11,053
World Stocks-to-Use Ratios
     Crop Year
        2000/01       1999/00 1998/99
                    (March Projection)       (Estimate)        (Actual)
           (Percent)
Corn 17.58 20.68 21.00
Soybeans 16.52 16.72 16.71
Wheat 18.24 20.99 23.24
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Average Farm Prices
Received by Iowa Farmers
 Feb.*            Jan.
            2001          2001     2000
                              ($/Bushel)
Corn 1.81 1.86 1.91
Soybeans 4.18 4.53 4.67
Oats 1.25 1.39 1.45
                                    ($/Ton)
Alfalfa 86.00 80.00
All Hay 84.00 79.00
                                    ($/Cwt.)
Steers & Heifers 77.50 77.40 69.30
Feeder Calves 99.00 98.90 98.30
Cows 40.30 38.50 39.60
Barrows & Gilts 42.20 39.20 41.90
Sows 34.50 34.40 41.50
Sheep† 45.70 37.40
Lambs† 67.00 68.00
           ($/Dozen)
Eggs 0.41 0.37 0.49
             ($/Cwt.)
All Milk 12.90 10.90
*Mid-month                †Estimate
      Feb.
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
2001 2000 Avg 96-00
Iowa Ag Review
6        CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      SPRING 2001
Iowa Ag Review
trend also follows for Iowa. The per-
centage of intended Bt corn falls
slightly, while acreage to be planted
to herbicide resistant corn increases.
Overall, 28 percent of the intended
2001 Iowa corn crop will be planted
with biotechnology varieties.
In 2000, a majority of the
nation’s soybean crop was geneti-
cally modified. Fifty-four percent
of the crop was herbicide resistant.
In Iowa, the percentage was even
higher, at 59 percent. The intentions
for 2001 show continued growth
for herbicide resistant soybeans.
Nationally, producers indicate that
63 percent of the soybean crop will
be of a biotechnology variety. Iowa
soybean producers indicate that 62
percent of the new crop will be
herbicide resistant.
In the livestock sector, the major
concern is the current outbreak of
foot-and-mouth disease in Europe.
As of this writing, the United King-
dom had reported nearly 1,000 con-
firmed cases. France reported two
cases. The Netherlands had ten
cases. Ireland had a single case of
FMD. Two other European countries,
Germany and Denmark, were investi-
gating suspected cases as well. In
addition, Argentina has experienced
a resurgence of FMD. In response
to these outbreaks, the United States,
Russia, and Japan have temporarily
banned imports of live animals,
frozen and chilled red meats, and
other meats not meeting processing
standards to remove the threat of
the FMD virus spreading from the
European Union and Argentina.
The primary domestic impacts
will be on U.S. beef and pork im-
ports. European Union beef imports
were already restricted due to bo-
vine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE). The import ban on European
Union pork locks out one of our ma-
jor suppliers—Denmark. The uncer-
tainty about Denmark’s FMD status,
combined with this temporary ban,
has added and will continue to add
volatility to both the U.S. hog and
pork markets. Average hog prices
have moved from $39.10 per hun-
dredweight (cwt) in February to
$45.10 in March. The uncertainty
about European pork supplies will
contribute more upward pressure on
hog and pork prices.
Tighter beef supplies, FMD con-
cerns, and the severity of the recent
winter have helped boost retail beef
prices. Average retail prices set a
record for January at $3.21 per
pound. In February, average prices
rose to $3.34 per pound. Marketings
are expected to rise as the spring
progresses, putting downward
pressure on prices.
Governor Vilsack has joined a
chorus of people calling for addi-
tional U.S. safeguards for preventing
the spread of foot-and-mouth disease.
Concern over the possibility of infec-
tion has moved officials to test more
domestic animals suspected of hav-
ing the disease. The U.S. Department
of Agriculture state agricultural de-
partments are gearing up with more
information about the disease, its
transmission, and the economic im-
pact it could have on the livestock
sector and the U.S. economy. The
Iowa Department of Agriculture and
Land Stewardship has produced a
pamphlet titled “Foot-and-Mouth
Disease: What You Need to Know.”
It is available at www2.state.ia.us/
agriculture/foot&mouth3.pdf.
Statewide cash receipts rose in
2000. Total cash receipts recovered
to nearly $11 billion, approaching
1998 levels and well above the $9.7
billion in cash receipts for 1999.
However, all of this recovery came in
Iowa’s Agricultural Situation
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the livestock sector. Crop cash
receipts actually fell between 1999
and 2000 by $35 million.
The reduction in crop cash re-
ceipts has not been paralleled by a
similar reduction in cropland cash
rental rates. In 1996, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture reported average
rental rates for Iowa of $105 per acre
of cropland. In 2000, the average rate
rose to $115 per acre. If crop cash re-
ceipts are not supporting cash rental
rates, then what is? The answer may
be government payments. The follow-
ing table shows 1996–2000 values for
crop cash receipts, average cropland
rental rates, and fiscal year govern-
ment payments for Iowa. While crop
cash receipts have been decreasing
over the last few years, government
payments (mainly in the form of loan
deficiency and market loss assistance
payments) have been on the rise.
If these government payments
have been incorporated into the
cropland rental rates, then the pay-
ments are passed on to the landown-
ers through the agricultural
producers renting the land. If, how-
ever, rental rates are not closely tied
to government payments, then cash-
renting producers are negatively
impacted by a reduction in govern-
ment payments. The worst-case
scenario for cash-renting producers
would be if cash rental rates rise with
increasing government payments but
do not fall when the payments de-
crease (assuming everything else
remains the same). In this case, the
benefits from the increased payments
accrue to the landowner, but the cash
renter absorbs the losses from the
subsequent drop in payments.
Crop Cash  Average Cropland Fiscal Year
Receipts Rental Rate Government Payments
Year ($ billion) ($ per acre) ($ billion)
1996 6.695 105 0.508
1997 7.354 110 0.713
1998 6.300 113 1.146
1999 5.004 112 1.876
2000 4.979 115
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penditure from these proposals
would add to the U.S. amber box
spending (barring de minimis exemp-
tions). Therefore, the probability of
the United States exceeding its WTO
domestic support limit would in-
crease under these proposals. For
example, if the SIP proposal with a
95 percent coverage level had been
in place instead of the MLA pay-
ments, then the United States would
have exceeded the amber box spend-
ing caps in 1999. Figure 2 shows the
estimated payments and the extent
to which we would have exceeded
the limits.
As the URAA now stands, the goal
of having a new countercyclical farm
program conflicts with the goal of re-
ducing trade-distorting policies. Most
variations on a countercyclical farm
program would fail to qualify for a
green box exemption, due to their
very countercyclical nature. After all,
how can a program be countercyclical
if it cannot be based on current prices
and yields? Efforts to construct a
green box countercyclical farm pro-
gram would require a redefinition of
the meaning of “countercyclical.”
Adding a new amber box counter-
cyclical program might require the
elimination of one or more existing
policies. Such a move could be justi-
fied because both the price support
and crop insurance programs provide
countercyclical support. A new pro-
gram could substitute quite effectively
for either program.
WHY THE WTO?
Why might it make sense for the
United States to place limits on its
ability to subsidize agriculture?
There are two reasons. The first is
that as a large exporter of agricul-
tural products, U.S. farmers will ben-
efit from increased agricultural
trade. Of course, some producers
who compete directly with imports,
such as producers of sugar, dairy
products, and peanuts, would face
increased competition from freer
trade, but, overall, U.S. producers
would be big winners from expanded
trade. Thus, it makes sense for the
United States to limit its subsidies in
exchange for limits on other coun-
tries’ subsidies. This is the standard
explanation for why the WTO agree-
ment makes sense.
The second reason why it might
make sense for Congress and the ad-
ministration to negotiate limits is
that it strengthens the hand of those
who believe increased subsidization
of agriculture is not in the best inter-
est of either agriculture or the coun-
FIGURE 2. Total amber box spending with a 95 percent SIP program
try as a whole. That is, WTO limits
place an upper bound on the level of
“coupled” support that can be given
to agriculture. Coupled support
means farmers’ production deci-
sions are influenced by the program
as well as by market signals. Not sur-
prisingly, policymakers find it easier
to say no to farm groups if there is
some external constraint that they
can point to. Congress and farm
groups are finding that the WTO
agreement is one such constraint, a
constraint that works to limit the
effects of farm programs on domes-
tic and world markets. 
Continued from page 3
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The number one failure ofcurrent U.S. farm policy is itsinability to control supply, at
least according to some policy-mak-
ers and analysts. With guaranteed
minimum prices, farmers are finding
it in their interest to maintain high
planted acreage, even as market
prices remain low. Congress is un-
likely to eliminate the price guaran-
tees, so some advocates are looking
for a return to acreage controls to
raise market prices. Opponents of
acreage controls argue that unilat-
eral decreases in U.S. acreage would
only encourage our competitors to
expand acreage. The ultimate effect,
they argue, would be less U.S. acre-
age, more acreage in foreign coun-
tries, and little price change.
Livestock interests see acreage con-
trols through the lens of higher feed
costs. They are typically opposed to
anything that would raise them.
A key factor in determining the
effects of acreage controls is
whether other countries would ex-
pand their own supply in response.
To find out if this would be the case,
Senator Tom Harkin asked the Food
and Agricultural Policy Research
Institute (FAPRI) to evaluate the im-
pact of a 10 percent reduction in
acreage in U.S. agriculture, affecting
all program crops uniformly. FAPRI
modeled the 10 percent decrease as
starting in crop year 2003 (the 2003/
04 marketing season) and lasting
eight years until 2010, the last year
of the 2001 FAPRI baseline. The acre-
age decrease was then measured
relative to this baseline. Because
acreage increases over time in the
FAPRI baseline, the model increased
Can Acreage Controls Increase Iowa Farm Revenue?
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the number of acres pulled out of
production over time as well. The
model assumes a fixed relative acre-
age of planted crops at the baseline
level, an assumption that implies
that the estimated price effects of an
acreage reduction are an upper
bound on what would actually result
from such a policy shift. In reality,
both U.S. and foreign crop yields
could increase substantially because
of land slippage and because of
higher net returns per unit of land.
IMPACT ON COMMODITY PRICES
The graph shows the estimated price
impact of the acreage reduction. (For
more details of the analysis,  see
FAPRI briefing paper 01-BP 33, avail-
able at ww.fapri.iastate.edu.) As
shown, a 10 percent reduction in
corn acreage has a larger price im-
pact than a 10 percent reduction in
soybean acreage. The reason for this
larger increase is that there are no
foreign corn producers who can
readily expand production to replace
U.S. corn production. For soybeans,
Brazil expands its oilseeds area and
mitigates the rise in soybean prices.
In addition, there are fewer substitutes
for corn than for soybeans, which
means that corn consumers have less
flexibility in reducing corn use.
In the model, both corn and soy-
bean prices increase by the largest
amount in year two. In the first year,
price run-ups are less than what
might be expected because crop in-
ventories are used to make up for
the short crop. In subsequent years,
inventories remain low and play a
smaller role in mitigating price in-
creases. The price impacts shrink
over time as foreign production ex-
pands and begins to capture an in-
creasing share of export markets,
especially for soybeans. The FAPRI
analysts estimate that Brazilian
planted soybean acres would in-
crease by approximately 1.2 million
acres per year during the eight-year
period. According to the analysts,
this increase would be driven in part
by the decrease in U.S. planted acres
and in part by continued Brazilian
investment in transportation infra-
structure.
The effects of higher feed prices
on livestock prices are moderate be-
FIGURE 1. Percentage increase in U.S. corn and soybean prices from
a 10 percent reduction in U.S. acreage
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cause the increase in feed cost is
relatively small. Projected prices of
beef (Nebraska Direct Fed-Steer)
increase by 1.4 percent. Projected
prices of pork (Iowa Southern
Minnesota Barrows and Gilts) in-
crease by 5.6 percent. Beef prices
are less sensitive to feed costs
because the feed cost share is
smaller in beef production than in
pork, and because pasture-fed cattle
can substitute for grain-fed cattle.
Because of these price increases,
world supplies of beef, pork, and
poultry decrease by 360 thousand
metric tons (about 0.3 percent).
INCREASE IN FARM REVENUES
The potential for acreage reductions
to result in increased revenue is lim-
ited, especially for soybean produc-
The United States Departmentof Agriculture (USDA) spendsover $30 billion a year on food
and nutrition assistance programs,
an amount that is over one-half of
the USDA budget today. Historically,
U.S. food assistance programs fea-
tured purchase and distribution of
surplus agricultural commodities to
low-income households and to
school lunch programs. Today, food
and nutrition assistance includes a
wide range of programs designed to
provide low-income households ac-
cess to adequate nutrients and a bal-
anced diet, to increase food security
in the general population and reduce
hunger, especially for children, and
to encourage low-income adults and
children to acquire knowledge and
skills to improve their diets with bet-
ter food choices through nutrition
education programs.
USDA’s Nutrition Education Program Pays Long-Term Benefits
A recent study in Iowa shows
that USDA’s Expanded Food and Nu-
trition Education Program (EFNEP)
has been successful in achieving
improved diets among low-income
youth and low-income families with
young children. (See CARD Staff Re-
port 00-SR 93.) The Iowa study
evaluated the costs and benefits of
Iowa EFNEP to measure the net eco-
nomic impact of the program from
September 1998 to February 2000
for the seven Iowa counties offering
the program to eligible participants.
The study finds that Iowa EFNEP re-
turns benefits of $10.75 in reduced
long-term health costs for every
$1.00 spent in program costs.
EFNEP is an educational inter-
vention program designed to help
limited-income youth and adults with
young children acquire the knowl-
edge, skills, attitudes, and changed
behavior leading to the improvement
of the total family diet and nutri-
tional well-being. Participants learn
Helen Jensen
hhjensen@iastate.edu
515-294-6253
about low-cost, nutritious foods and
about managing food expenditures,
including the use of Food Stamps and
WIC coupons. The federal program
operates at approximately $60 mil-
lion per year and has been in exist-
ence since 1969.
Funding for the Iowa EFNEP
comes from USDA. During the 2000
program year, the Iowa program
served about 2,200 families in eight
counties. In addition, over 17,000
Continued
ers. After eight years, the 10 percent
decrease in U.S. acreage would in-
crease the price of corn by 12.9 per-
cent and the price of soybeans by 6
percent. For the Iowa farmer who is
in a 50-50 corn-soybean rotation,
this means that revenue per planted
acre would increase by about 9.6
percent. But, of course, there are 10
percent fewer planted acres, which
means that total revenue would
decline by a small amount. This de-
cline in total revenue must then be
compared to the decrease in pro-
duction cost that comes about
because of fewer planted acres.
In all likelihood, the FAPRI esti-
mates overstate the price impacts of
a reduction in U.S. planted acreage
if it were implemented as a policy.
History tells us that profit-driven
farmers, both in the United States
and around the world, have a great
deal of imagination when it comes to
taking full advantage of opportuni-
ties caused by big changes in policy.
Undoubtedly, the net effect of an at-
tempt to decrease U.S. crop acreage
by 10 percent would result in less
than a 10 percent reduction in U.S.
planted acreage and quite a bit less
than a 10 percent reduction in pro-
duction. And overseas, farmers
would increasingly devote attention
to supplying program crops that are
in relatively short supply. 
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youth participated through school or
after-school programs. Eighty-four
percent of Iowa EFNEP families had
incomes below 100 percent of the
Federal Poverty Income Guidelines,
and 53 percent had incomes below
50 percent of poverty. The 2000
poverty threshold set for a family of
four is $17,050. The EFNEP program
is designed as a series of lessons,
conducted for participating indivi-
duals by paraprofessionals and
volunteers, many of whom come
from the targeted population.
The study of the costs and ben-
efits of Iowa EFNEP was completed
in August 2000 (see CARD Staff Report
00-SR 93). The benefits of the program
were measured through questions
administered to the adult participants
as they entered the program, and at
the end of the program. The data
included food intake measured by
24-hour food recall, food practices
including the safe handling of food,
and resource management. These
data, along with evidence concerning
the relationship of various food prac-
tices and nutritional behavior to the
onset of diseases, were used to deter-
mine a specific percentage of those
practicing “optimal nutritional behav-
ior” for each disease. The challenge in
doing such a cost-benefit study is to
quantify the “improved health” of
program participants. Current health
care costs, current wage rates, and
the changes in food practices and nu-
tritional behaviors were used to quan-
tify the benefits that occur with
changes in nutritional habits.
Benefits of the program (that is,
future health cost savings) occur
because participants
• learn safe food handling prac-
tices, and thus have fewer
foodborne illnesses;
• eat better during pregnancy, re-
sulting in fewer low birthweight
babies;
• are more likely to breastfeed
their babies, resulting in fewer
childhood diseases;
• improve overall diets, resulting
in delay or prevention of chronic
diseases.
The relevant nutrition-related
diseases and conditions are bro-
ken into three categories. The first
category includes diseases consid-
ered life-threatening with the aver-
age onset delayed only through
good nutritional habits. The dis-
eases included in this category are
stroke, hypertension, colorectal
cancer, and heart disease. The
second category includes non-life
threatening diseases. Good nutri-
tional food-related habits contrib-
ute to avoiding these diseases,
which include osteoporosis,
foodborne illness, obesity, diabe-
tes, and commonly occurring
infant diseases. The third category
includes conditions that require a
one-time treatment and which can
be avoided through good nutri-
tional habits. For this study, low
birth-weight babies are considered
in the third category. The sum of
the positive outcomes related to
optimal nutritional behavior for
these three types of diseases is
the benefit of EFNEP. The benefits
for EFNEP over the time period
totaled $14,354,479. The costs of
EFNEP include the sum of all state-
wide salary costs, part-time
county wage costs, transporta-
tional costs for the participants, as
well as county rent, utility, travel,
supplies, and fixed costs. These
costs totaled $1,334,848 for the
same time period.
A number of analyses help
band a reasonable range for the
benefit-cost figure. One analysis
uses more recent medical findings
to determine the percentage of par-
ticipants practicing optimal nutri-
tional behavior. Because the
incidence rate for osteoporosis is
higher, this analysis leads to a ben-
efit-to-cost figure of $12.50/$1.00.
Another analysis cuts the number
of participants practicing optimal
nutritional behavior by 75 percent
to simulate the possibility that
more participants stop practicing
optimal nutritional behavior in the
future. That analysis gives a ben-
efit-to-cost ratio of $2.64/$1.00.
The results of the analysis of
Iowa’s program show that large
economic savings exist because of
the EFNEP program, and these were
positive even under a range of as-
sumptions. The results in Iowa are
similar to those of another study
on EFNEP in Virginia. Both studies
show that individuals with better
information about nutrition do a
better job of following federal di-
etary recommendations and that
the more a mother knows about
health and nutrition, the better is
the overall quality of her child’s
diet. EFNEP may be successful be-
cause it is a program that reaches
its target audiences at a time when
the benefits of healthy diets may
be especially high. Food assistance
programs have made a concerted
effort in recent years to increase
nutrition education efforts. With
nutrition education becoming a
more important part of food assis-
tance programs, it is important to
consider how it can best be deliv-
ered and how its effectiveness can
be assessed. The finding of a favor-
able benefit-cost ratio for EFNEP
lends support to efforts to increase
funding for such nutrition educa-
tion programs and, thus, achieve
savings in health care costs.
The study finds
that Iowa EFNEP
returns benefits of
$10.75 in reduced
long-term health
costs for every
$1.00 spent in
program costs.
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Sandra Clarke
Meet the Staff: Sandra Clarke
Sandra Clarke joined CARD ascommunications manager inNovember. Her professional
background includes seven years as
communications manager at the
American Agricultural Economics
Association (AAEA), where she was
technical editor of the American
Journal of Agricultural Economics
and managing editor of Choices—
The Magazine of Food, Farm, and
Resource Issues. Before that, she
worked in communications and pub-
lic affairs for the City of Cottonwood,
Arizona, and she edited a specialty
art magazine for Heartland Commu-
nications in Fort Dodge. She’s a 1987
Iowa State journalism and communi-
cations graduate.
Sandy oversaw the AAEA’s transi-
tion to desktop publishing in early
1994, and she says that publishing is
a never-ending exercise in adapting
to new media and new technologies.
“Desktop publishing was a big
deal in the eighties and early nine-
ties. That was just a drop in the
bucket compared to what the
internet means to publishing.”
Most of CARD’s research and
information is now conveyed
through the portal of the organi-
zation’s website (www.card.iastate.
edu). But the internet, according to
Sandy, creates as many challenges
as it does opportunities.
“For instance, I ask myself how
we can fight through the informa-
tion overload or bring clarity to an
issue when there is so much infor-
mation out there competing for
attention in the public realm.
Luckily, this organization has a lot
of history and a solid reputation
that keeps us in the forefront
when it comes to communicating
with policymakers and agricul-
tural leaders.”
Her experience with the Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Econom-
ics and Choices magazine has
helped Sandy to understand the
publishing process from the other
side of the desk, which means she
has a unique vantage point in assist-
ing faculty and researchers as they
prepare working papers for peer
review or journal submission.
“I had already worked with sev-
eral faculty members here on
journal or magazine articles, so I
knew what to expect in terms of the
papers and reports that are part of
CARD’s publication series. I enjoy
helping scholars to improve their
papers and articles. And beyond the
day-to-day publishing, I work to cre-
ate connections and get CARD
analysis and findings into the hands
of those who are making the deci-
sions or framing the debates in
agricultural policy.”
Sandy is managing editor of the
Iowa Ag Review, one of CARD’s ef-
forts to present its news and infor-
mation to interested readers.
Other outreach vehicles include
CARD websites, and the annual
Agricultural Forum, which Sandy
helps to plan.
“I learned a lot, working on my
first Forum. I like the way that CARD
tries to facilitate a broad-based dis-
cussion of breaking issues. I think
it’s unique, the many voices and
perspectives that come together at
a CARD Forum. Public discourse is
healthy, and there seems to be no
shortage of contentious questions
in agricultural policy.”
Outside of the office, Sandy can
often be found exploring the streets
and trails of Ames with her golden
retriever. She also likes to cook,
especially to try new dishes, but
admits she enjoys eating out “way
too often.” She seeks out local live
music, including music festivals,
which often figure prominently in
her summer weekend plans. She
and her husband Al, who teaches
English at ISU, like to travel and
hike on occasion, particularly in the
high desert of the Southwest.
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